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Abstract—In this paper, we study the problem of secure
transmission with covert requirement in untrusted relaying net-
works. Our considered system model consists of one source, one
destination, one untrusted relay, and one Willie. The untrusted
relay tries to extract the information signal, while the goal
of Willie is to detect the presence of the information signal
transmitted by the source, in the current time slot. To overcome
these two attacks, we illustrate that the destination and the
source should inject jamming signal to the network in phase
I and phase II, respectively. Accordingly, the communication
in our proposed system model is accomplished in two phases.
In the first phase, when the source transmits its data to the
untrusted relay the destination broadcasts its jamming signal.
In the second phase, when the relay retransmits the received
signal, the source transmits a jamming signal with one of its
antennas. For this system model, we propose a power allocation
strategy to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate subject to
satisfying the covert requirements in both of the phases. Since
the proposed optimization problem is non-convex, we adopt the
Successive Convex Approximation (SCA) approach to convert it
to a convex optimization problem. Next, we extend our system
model to a practical system model where there are multiple
untrusted relays and multiple Willies under two scenarios of non-
colluding Willies and colluding Willies. Our findings highlight
that unlike the direct transmission scheme, the achievable secrecy
rate of the proposed secure transmission scheme improve as the
number of untrusted relays increases.
Index Terms— Covert communication, physical-layer security,
untrusted relay, joint relay selection and power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy and security against eavesdropping play vital role
in wireless communication networks and hence, significant
attentions should be payed to these areas. To tackle the
eavesdropping attack, physical layer security (PLS) has been
widely investigated in different system models since Wyners
introduced the wiretap channel concept [1]. Wyner demon-
strates when the eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version
of the legitimate users channel, a positive secrecy rate is
achievable, [2]. Toward this end, several techniques have been
proposed to enhance the PLS: transmit beamforming [3], [4],
antenna selection [5], [6], cooperative techniques [7]- [9], and
artificial noise aided transmission [10]- [12].
Relaying is an effective approach for enhancing energy
efficiency, increasing coverage, and improving throughput in
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wireless communications. However, an untrusted relay may
intentionally overhear the information signal when relaying,
i.e., the untrusted relay is a collaborator in service level while
it may be an eavesdropper in data level. This scenario occurs in
large-scale wireless systems such as heterogeneous networks
and Internet-of-things (IoT) applications, where confidential
messages are often retransmitted by intermediate nodes.
To achieve a positive secrecy rate in untrusted relaying
networks, the destination-based cooperative jamming (DBCJ)
scheme was first introduced in [13]. We note that in the
DBCJ the destination itself contributes to degrade the received
signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at the helper node who may act
as an eavesdropper. Recently, several works have taken into
account both performance analysis and network optimization
of untrusted relaying network [14]– [17].
In some communication networks, low probability of de-
tection (LPD) or covert communication is necessary for data
transmission over electromagnetic and acoustic channels [18].
For military applications, LPD is interest when the transmitter
wishes to remain undetected, or when the knowledge of
communication may point to the presence of a receiver. As
such, in covert communication only the detection capability
of an eavesdropper is considered, i.e., an eavesdropper need
not be able to actually decode the communication signal. In
other words, the covert communication keeps military forces
from possible attacks [19]. In recent years, several papers have
investigated the covert communication in different wireless
communication networks [20]- [23]. Specifically, with the
idea of employing a jammer as proposed in [20], source
can transmit covertly to Bob in the presence of a careful
adversary Willie. The authors in [22] studied and compared
the performance of the PLS approach and the covert commu-
nication approach for a simple wiretap channel with the aim of
maximizing the secrecy/covert. Taking into account relaying,
the authors in [23] examined the achievable performance of
covert communication in amplify-and-forward (AF) one-way
relay networks. To bes specific, the relay is greedy and op-
portunistically transmits its own information to the destination
covertly besides retransmitting the sources message, while the
source attempts to detect this covert transmission to discover
the illegal usage of the resource dedicated only for the goal
of forwarding the sources information signal.
In this paper, we examine the power allocation problem
of an AF relaying system, where a multiple antenna source
transmits its confidential message to a single antenna desti-
nation in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. The relay
is considered to be both an essential helper and a potential
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2eavesdropper. In our considered network, while the untrusted
relay cannot decode the source message, the external eaves-
dropper is avoided to be aware from the communication in
order to provide a strong security in our wireless network. The
proposed secure transmission scheme using the untrusted relay
is accomplished in two phases. In the first phase, the source
transmits data with beamforming technique to the untrusted
relay, and simultaneously destination transmits artificial noise,
to confuse the curios relay. In the second phase, the relay am-
plifies the received signal of the first phase, while concurrently
the source transmits artificial noise. In the mentioned system
model, we take into account the power allocation problem in
each phase so that the untrusted relay is not able to extract
the information signal and Willie cannot decide about the
communication between legitimate parties of the network. Our
key contributions in this paper are summarized as follows:
• We formulate the power allocation between the source
and destination that maximizes the instantaneous secrecy
rate of untrusted relaying while concurrently hiding the
communication against the passive eavesdropping attack.
Since the optimization problem is non-convex, we exploit
the Successive Convex Approximation (SCA) approach to
convert it to a convex optimization problem.
• We extend our system model to a more practical system
model where there are multiple untrusted relays and
multiple Willies under two scenarios of non-colluding
Willies and colluding Willies. For this system model, we
develop a simple relay selection criterion. We highlight
that the secrecy rate of our proposed untrusted relaying
scenario improves with increasing number of relays.
• As a benchmark, we investigate the power allocation
between the information signal and the jamming signal
for the conventional direct transmission dispensing with
the relays to compare with the proposed transmission
scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present system and signal model. Section III
provides the detailed problem formulation. In Section IV,
we study multiple untrusted relays and introduce the relay
selection criterion in the considered system model. In Section
V, we investigate the scenario with multiple Willies under
two cases of non-colluding Willies and colluding Willies. In
Section VI, direct transmission scheme is studied. Numerical
results are presented in Section VII. Finally, paper is concluded
in Section VIII.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODEL
The system model under investigation is a one-way relay
network consisting of one multiple antenna source with Ns an-
tennas, a single antenna destination, a single antenna untrusted
amplify-and forward (AF) relay, and a single antenna Willie.
It should be noted the untrusted relay is helper at the service
level while it is untrusted at the data level. The untrusted relay
tries to extract the information signal, while the goal of Willie
is to detect whether the source has sent a signal to destination
or not, in the current time slot. Hence, to increase the error
probability of signal detection, the source transmits data in
Fig. 1: Secure transmission in untrusted relaying network with covert
requirement.
some time slots not during all of the time slots. In addition,
we assume all the nodes operate under half-duplex mode. Our
proposed network operates at two phases. In the first phase, the
source transmits data with beamforming technique toward the
untrusted relay, and the destination transmits artificial noise
to decrease the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR)
of the relay and to deceive Willie. In the second phase,
the relay normalizes the received signal and broadcasts it.
In this time, the source for deceiving Willie emits jamming
signal. See Fig 2. This communication is performed through
a discrete-time channel with T time slots at which each time
slot consists of n symbols. The source’s data signal and the
jamming signal of the source and the destination in each
time slot can be expressed as x(1)s =
[
x
1(1)
s , x
2(1)
s , . . . , x
n(1)
s
]
,
x
(2)
s =
[
x
1(2)
s , x
2(2)
s , . . . , x
n(2)
s
]
, and xd =
[
x1d, x
2
d, . . . , x
n
d
]
,
respectively.
The complex Gaussian channel between the source and
untrusted relay, source and Willie, untrusted relay and Willie,
untrusted relay and destination, and destination and Willie
are denoted by hsr ∼ CN (0Ns×1, µsrINs×1), hsw ∼
CN (0Ns×1, µswINs×1), hrw ∼ CN (0, µrw) , hrd ∼
CN (0, µrd), and hdw ∼ CN (0, µdw), respectively, where I
is the identity matrix, 0 is the zero matrix, and µsr, µsw,
µrw, µrd, µdw are variances of each link per branch.
The received `th signal in the each time slot, at untrusted
relay in the first phase is given by
y`r =

√
(1− ρ)Phrdx`d + n`r, Ψ0,
√
ρPwHhsrx
`(1)
s +
√
(1− ρ)Phrdx`d + n`r, Ψ1,
(1)
where x`(1)s and x`d are the transmitted `
th symbols by source
and destination, respectively and n`r ∼ CN
(
0, σ2
)
is Additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the untrusted relay. Note
that, codebook for x`d is unknown at both relay and Willie
while codebook for x`(1)s is known at relay and unknown at
Willie. P is maximum allowable transmit power at each node
3and ρ is transmit power allocation factor in the first phase.
Since Willie’s CSI is not available, we consider weight vector
w = hsr‖hsr‖ , which represents the maximum ratio transmission
(MRT) beamformer at the source. Moreover, notation Ψ0 states
that source does not transmit data to relay, while Ψ1 states that
source transmits data to relay.
In the second phase, the untrusted relay normalizes the
received signal and transmits it with power
√
(1− ξ)P . In
other words, the relay amplifies signal by an amplification
factor of
Gr =

√
(1−ξ)P
(1−ρ)P‖hrd‖2+σ2 , Ψ0,√
(1−ξ)P
ρP‖wHhsr‖2+(1−ρ)P‖hrd‖2+σ2 , Ψ1,
(2)
and it transmits x`r = Gry
`
r. While the relay broadcasts signal,
the source transmits artificial noise to deceive Willie. The
received `th signal at the destination after performing self-
interference cancellation is given by
y`d =

n`d, Ψ0,
Gr
√
ρPwHhsrhrdx
`(1)
s +Grn
`
rhrd + n
`
d, Ψ1,
(3)
where n`d ∼ CN
(
0, σ2
)
is the AWGN noise at the destination.
To simplify the mathematical formulation, we define two
parameters γsr and γrd as γsr =
P
∥∥∥∥ hHsr‖hsr‖hsr
∥∥∥∥2
σ2 and γrd =
P‖hrd‖2
σ2 . Hence, the received SINR at the relay and the
destination can be written as follows
γD =

0, Ψ0,
G2rρP
∥∥∥∥ hHsr‖hsr‖hsr
∥∥∥∥2‖hrd‖2
G2rσ
2‖hrd‖2+σ2
(a)
= ργsrγrd(1−ξ)
ργsr+(2−ρ−ξ)γrd+1 , Ψ1,
(4)
γR =

0, Ψ0,
ρP
∥∥∥∥ hHsr‖hsr‖hsr
∥∥∥∥2
(1−ρ)P‖hrd‖2+σ2
(a)
= ργsr
(1−ρ)γrd+1 , Ψ1,
(5)
where (a) follows from substituting (2). Under high SNR
assumption, (4) is simplified as
γD =

0, Ψ0,
ργsrγrd(1−ξ)
ργsr+(2−ρ−ξ)γrd =
ρςrγrd(1−ξ)
ρςr+2−ρ−ξ , Ψ1,
(6)
where ςr = γsrγrd . It is important to notice that deleting “ + 1”
from the denominator of γR is equivalent to ignore the AWGN
noise at the untrusted relay, which is equivalent to the highest
eavesdropping at the relay. Hence, we can rewrite (5) as follow
γR =

0, Ψ0,
ργsr
(1−ρ)γrd =
ρςr
1−ρ , Ψ1,
(7)
III. POWER ALLOCATION FOR SECRECY RATE
MAXIMIZATION WITH COVERT COMMUNICATION
REQUIREMENT
In this section, we aim to maximize the secrecy rate by
considering covert requirement at Willie.
A. Physical layer security
The instantaneous secrecy is defined as [2]
Rsec = [log (1 + γD) − log (1 + γR)]+, (8)
where log (1 + γD) and log (1 + γR) are the achievable in-
formation rates at the destination and the untrusted relay,
respectively, where [v]+ = max (v, 0).
As mentioned before, the source transmits its data during
some time slots to hide transmission from Willie. Therefore,
by defining prt as the probability of signal transmission by
the source, the secrecy rate can be rewritten as
Rsec =
prt
2
[
log
(
1 +
ρςrγrd (1− ξ)
ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ
)
(9)
− log
(
1 +
ρςr
1− ρ
)]+
.
Note that for ρ = 0, the secrecy rate is zero. As such, for op-
timal power allocation, we have, Rsec ≥ 0 and consequently,
(9) can be rewritten as
Rsec =
prt
2
[
log
(
1 +
ρςrγrd (1− ξ)
ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ
)
(10)
− log
(
1 +
ρςr
1− ρ
)]
.
B. Covert requirement
Based on the received signal power at Willie, it decides
whether the data is transmitted or not. The received `th signal
at Willie in the first phase is given by
y`(1)w = (11)
√
(1− ρ)Phdwx`d + n`(1)w , Ψ0,
√
ρPwHhswx
`(1)
s +
√
(1− ρ)Phdwx`d + n`(1)w , Ψ1,
where n`(1)w ∼ CN
(
0, σ2w
)
is the AWGN noise at Willie. Note
that in the covert communication literature, it is assumed that
the codebook for data signal (x`(1)s ) is unknown at Willie.
Furthermore, the received `thsignal at Willie in the second
phase is given by
y`(2)w = (12)
√
ξPhswx
`(2)
s + n
`(2)
w , Ψ0,(√
ρPwHhsrx
`(1)
s +
√
(1− ρ)Phrdx`d + nr
)
×
Grhrw +
√
ξPhswx
`(2)
s + n
`(2)
w ,
Ψ1,
where n`(2)w ∼ CN
(
0, σ2w
)
is the AWGN noise at Willie in
second phase. In the covert communication, Willie selects a
threshold and based on comparison between total received
4Fig. 2: Source decides to transmit data in even slots with probability prt, also relay decides to transmit data in odd slots with probability
prt, which Willie attempts to detect a transmission in theses slots.
power and selected threshold, decides whether source trans-
mits data or not. In other words, Willie decides in the first
and second phase based on Y
(1)
w
n
Ψ1
≷
Ψ0
ϑ(1), and Y
(1)
w
n
Ψ1
≷
Ψ0
ϑ(2),
respectively, which is demonstrated in [20], this rule is optimal
decision rule in points of view Willie. where Yw =
n∑`
=1
∣∣y`w∣∣2
is defined as the total power received by Willie during a time
slot.
When the source transmits data but Willie decides Ψ0, miss
detection with probability of PMD happens, while if source
does not transmit data but Willie decides Ψ1, false alarm with
probability of PFA happens. While the following constraint is
satisfied:
for any ε ≥ 0, PMD + PFA ≥ 1− ε, as n→∞. (13)
we can say which our communication is covert, [20]. The
false alarm and miss detection probabilities in the first phase
are respectively, given by
P(1)FA = (14)
P
(
Y
(1)
w
n
> ϑ(1) |Ψ0
)
= P
((
σ2w + γ
(1)
) χ22n
n
> ϑ(1) |Ψ0
)
,
P(1)MD = (15)
P
(
Y
(1)
w
n
< ϑ(1) |Ψ1
)
= P
((
σ2w + γ
(1)
) χ22n
n
< ϑ(1) |Ψ1
)
,
where χ22n presents a chi-squared random variable, with 2n de-
grees of freedom. Furthermore by using (11), γ(1) is expressed
as
γ(1) =

(1− ρ)P |hdw|2, Ψ0,
ρP
∥∥∥ hHsr‖hsr‖hsw∥∥∥2 + (1− ρ)P |hdw|2, Ψ1. (16)
Moreover, based on same argument, the false alarm and
miss detection probabilities in second phase are respectively,
defined as
P(2)FA = (17)
P
(
Y
(2)
w
n
> ϑ(2) |Ψ0
)
= P
((
σ2w + γ
(2)
) χ22n
n
> ϑ(2) |Ψ0
)
,
P(2)MD = (18)
P
(
Y
(2)
w
n
< ϑ(2) |Ψ1
)
= P
((
σ2w + γ
(2)
) χ22n
n
< ϑ(2) |Ψ1
)
.
By employing (12), γ(2) can be written as follows
γ(2) =
 ξP |hsw|
2
, Ψ0,
(1− ξ)P |hrw|2 + ξP |hsw|2, Ψ1,
(19)
According to the strong law of large numbers (SLLN), χ
2
2n
n
converges to 1, and based on lebesgues dominated convergence
theorem [24] we can replace χ
2
2n
n with 1, when n→∞. Hence,
the false alarm and the miss detection probabilities in the first
phase can be rewritten as follows
P(1)FA = P
(
σ2w + γ
(1) > ϑ(1) |Ψ0
)
, (20)
P(1)MD = P
(
σ2w + γ
(1) < ϑ(1) |Ψ1
)
, (21)
also in the second phase, we haves:
P(2)FA = P
(
σ2w + γ
(2) > ϑ(2) |Ψ0
)
, (22)
P(2)MD = P
(
σ2w + γ
(2) < ϑ(2) |Ψ1
)
. (23)
For solving (20)-(23), we need to probability density function
(PDF) of γ(1) and γ(2), hence, we approximate one term in
γ(1). By exploiting the law of large numbers for large Ns [25],
[26], we have the following approximation∥∥∥∥ hHsr‖hsr‖hsw
∥∥∥∥2 =
∥∥hHsrhsw∥∥2
‖hsr‖2
≈ Λ =
∥∥hHsrhsw∥∥2
Nsµsr
(24)
moreover, by utilization of Lindeberg-Levy central limit theo-
rem, distribution of random variable hHsrhsw can be approxi-
mated as CN (0, Nsµsrµsw), hence, we can consider Λ as an
exponential random variable with mean µsw. Finally, we have
the following PDFs for γ(1) and γ(2), respectively,
fΓ1
(
γ(1)
)
=
1
(1−ρ)Pµdw e
− γ(1)
(1−ρ)Pµdw , Ψ0,
1
P (ρµsw−(1−ρ)µdw)
[
e−
γ(1)
ρPµsw − e− γ
(1)
(1−ρ)Pµdw
]
, Ψ1.
(25)
fΓ2
(
γ(2)
)
=
1
ξPµsw
e−
γ(2)
ξPµsw , Ψ0,
1
P (ξµsw−(1−ξ)µrw)
[
e−
γ(2)
ξPµsw − e− γ
(2)
(1−ξ)Pµrw
]
, Ψ1.
(26)
5By employing (25), (26) and substituting them into (20)-(23),
and after some mathematical manipulation we have
P(1)FA =

e
− 1
(1−ρ)Pµdw (ϑ
(1)−σ2w), ϑ(1) − σ2w > 0,
1, ϑ(1) − σ2w ≤ 0.
(27)
P(1)MD = (28)
1 + 1ρµsw−(1−ρ)µdw
×
[
−ρµswe− 1ρPµsw (ϑ
(1)−σ2w)
+ (1− ρ)µdwe−
1
(1−ρ)Pµdw (ϑ
(1)−σ2w)
] ϑ(2) − σ2w > 0,
0 ϑ(2) − σ2w ≤ 0.
P(2)FA =
 e
− 1ξPµsw (ϑ
(2)−σ2w), ϑ(2) − σ2w > 0,
1, ϑ(2) − σ2w ≤ 0.
(29)
P(2)MD = (30)
1 + 1ξµsw−(1−ξ)µrw
×
[
−ξµswe− 1ξPµsw (ϑ
(2)−σ2w)
+ (1− ξ)µrwe−
1
(1−ξ)Pµrw (ϑ
(2)−σ2w)
]
,
ϑ(2) − σ2w > 0,
0 ϑ(2) − σ2w ≤ 0.
According to (27)-(30), Willie try to selects decision threshold
greater than variance of noise in both phases, in other words
it selects ϑ(1) > σ2w and ϑ
(2) > σ2w. Because in otherwise,
P(1)FA + P
(1)
MD = 1 and P
(2)
FA + P
(2)
MD = 1.
Remark (The requirement for jamming signal transmission
in each phase). We illustrate, if destination and source do
not transmit jamming signal in phase 1 and 2, respectively,
the minimum error probability is near to zero, i.e., covert
requirement is not satisfied. Such as, in phase 1, without
transmission jamming signal, we have
P(1)FA =
 0, ϑ
(1) − σ2w > 0,
1, ϑ(1) − σ2w ≤ 0.
P(1)MD =
1− e− 1ρPµsw (ϑ(1)−σ2w) ϑ(1) − σ2w > 0,
0 ϑ(1) − σ2w ≤ 0.
(31)
It is clear that min
ϑ(1)
(
P(1)FA + P
(1)
MD
)
' 0. Likewise,
min
ϑ(2)
(
P(2)FA + P
(2)
MD
)
' 0.
C. power allocation optimization problem
In this section, we formulate an optimization problem,
with the goal of maximizing the achievable secrecy rate by
considering the covert requirement at Willie, i.e., (13) is
satisfied. Hence, the optimization problem is formulated as
max
ρ,ξ
prt
2
[
log
(
1 +
ρςrγrd (1− ξ)
ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ
)
(32a)
− log
(
1 +
ρςr
1− ρ
)]
,
s.t. : 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, (32b)
0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1, (32c)
min
ϑ(1)
(
P(1)FA + P
(1)
MD
)
≥ 1− ε, (32d)
min
ϑ(2)
(
P(2)FA + P
(2)
MD
)
≥ 1− ε, (32e)
Constraints (32b) and (32c) specify the range of power al-
location factors in the first and second phases, respectively.
Constraints (32d) and (32e) present the worst-case covert rate
requirement at Wilie in first and second phases, respectively.
In order to solve (32), we first solve (32d) and (32e), to obtain
optimal ϑ(1) and ϑ(2) from Wilie perspective.
1) Optimal Threshold for Willie: For obtaining optimal
ϑ(1) and ϑ(2), we derivative from P(1)FA + P
(1)
MD and P
(2)
FA +
P(2)MD respect to ϑ(1) and ϑ(2), respectively. After calculation
d
(
P(1)FA+P
(1)
MD
)
dϑ(1)
= 0 and
d
(
P(2)FA+P
(2)
MD
)
dϑ(2)
= 0 and some mathe-
matical manipulations, we have
ϑ
(1)
opt =
λ
(1)
j λ
(1)
s
λ
(1)
s − λ(1)j
ln
(
λ
(1)
s
λ
(1)
j
)
+ σ2w, (33)
ϑ
(2)
opt =
λ
(2)
j λ
(2)
s
λ
(2)
s − λ(2)j
ln
(
λ
(2)
s
λ
(2)
j
)
+ σ2w, (34)
where λ(1)j = (1− ρ)Pµdw, λ(1)s = ρPµsw, λ(2)j = ξPµsw,
and λ(2)s = (1− ξ)Pµrw. By substituting (33) and (34) into
(27), (28), (29), and (30) we have
P(1)FA + P
(1)
MD = e
− λ
(1)
s
λ
(1)
s −λ
(1)
j
ln
(
λ
(1)
s
λ
(1)
j
)
+
1
λ
(1)
s − λ(1)j
× (35)−λ(1)s e− λ
(1)
j
λ
(1)
s −λ
(1)
j
ln
(
λ
(1)
s
λ
(1)
j
)
+ λ
(1)
j e
− λ
(1)
s
λ
(1)
s −λ
(1)
j
ln
(
λ
(1)
s
λ
(1)
j
)+ 1,
P(2)FA + P
(2)
MD = e
− λ
(2)
s
λ
(2)
s −λ
(2)
j
ln
(
λ
(2)
s
λ
(2)
j
)
+
1
λ
(2)
j − λ(2)s
× (36)−λ(2)j e− λ
(2)
s
λ
(2)
s −λ
(2)
j
ln
(
λ
(2)
s
λ
(2)
j
)
+ λ(2)s e
− λ
(2)
j
λ
(2)
s −λ
(2)
j
ln
(
λ
(2)
s
λ
(2)
j
)+ 1.
By employing (35) and (36) the optimization problem (32)
can be reformulated as
6max
ρ,ξ
prt
2
[
log
(
1 +
ρςrγrd (1− ξ)
ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ
)
(37a)
− log
(
1 +
ρςr
1− ρ
)]
,
s.t. : (32b), (32c), (37b)
ln
(
λ
(1)
j
λ
(1)
s
)(
λ
(1)
j
λ
(1)
s − λ(1)j
)
≤ ln (ε) , (37c)
ln
(
λ
(2)
j
λ
(2)
s
)(
λ
(2)
j
λ
(2)
s − λ(2)j
)
≤ ln (ε) . (37d)
Finally, we should solve the following optimization problem:
max
ρ,ξ
prt
2
[
log
(
1 +
ρςrγrd (1− ξ)
ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ
)
(38a)
− log
(
1 +
ρςr
1− ρ
)]
,
s.t. : (32b), (32c), (38b)
ln
(
(1− ρ)µdw
ρµsw
)(
(1− ρ)µdw
ρµsw − (1− ρ)µdw
)
≤ ln (ε)
(38c)
ln
(
ξµsw
(1− ξ)µrw
)(
ξµsw
(1− ξ)µrw − ξµsw
)
≤ ln (ε) ,
(38d)
By utilization the axillary variables t0 and t1 and high SINR
assumption, the optimization problem (38) is equivalent to the
following problem
max
ρ,ξ,t0,t1
prt
2
[
log
(
ρςrγrd (1− ξ)
ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ
)
(39a)
− log
(
1 +
ρςr
1− ρ
)]
,
s.t. : (32b), (32c), (39b)
ln
(
(1− ρ)µdw
ρµsw
)
× (1− ρ)µdw − t0 ln (ε) ≤ 0, (39c)
ρµsw − (1− ρ)µdw ≤ t0, (39d)
ln
(
ξµsw
(1− ξ)µrw
)
× ξµsw − t1 ln (ε) ≤ 0, (39e)
(1− ξ)µrw − ξµsw ≤ t1. (39f)
This optimization problem is non-convex yet, because the
objective function is non-concave. To tackle this problem, we
employ Successive Convex approximation (SCA) approach to
approximate the objective function to concave function. The
objective function can be rewritten as follows
log (ρςrγrd (1− ξ)) + log (1− ρ)− log (ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ)−
log (1− ρ+ ρςr) . (40)
Since (40) is the difference between two concave functions,
we can employ Difference of two Concave functions (DC)
method to convert it to the concave function. Hence, we
can write (40) as Ξ (ρ, ξ) = Σ (ρ, ξ) − Ω (ρ, ξ), where
Σ (ρ, ξ) = log (ρςrγrd (1− ξ)) + log (1− ρ) and Ω (ρ, ξ) =
Algorithm 1 ITERATIVE POWER ALLOCATION ALGO-
RITHM
1: Initialization: Set µ = 0 (µ is the iteration number) and
initialize to ρ(0) and ξ(0).
2: Set ρ = ρ(µ) and ξ = ξ(µ),
3: Solve (43) and set the result to ρ(µ+ 1) and ξ(µ+ 1)
4: If |ρ (µ+ 1)− ρ (µ)| ≤ θ and |ξ (µ+ 1)− ξ (µ)| ≤ θ
stop,
else
set µ = µ+ 1 and go back to step 2
log (ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ) + log (1− ρ+ ρςr). By employing DC
method, we can rewrite Ω (ρ, ξ) as follows
Ω (ρ, ξ) ' Ω˜ (ρ, ξ) = Ω (ρ (µ− 1) , ξ (µ− 1)) + (41)
∇TΩ (ρ (µ− 1) , ξ (µ− 1)) · [ρ− ρ (µ− 1) , ξ − ξ (µ− 1)] ,
where µ is iteration number and ∇Ω (ρ, ξ) is gradient of
Ω (ρ, ξ) which is calculated as
∇Ω (ρ, ξ) =[
ςr − 1
ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ +
ςr − 1
1− ρ+ ρςr ,
−1
ρςr + 2− ρ− ξ
]
. (42)
Finally, by employing DC, we face to a convex optimization
problem as follows :
max
ρ,ξ,t0,t1
prt
2
(
Σ (ρ, ξ)− Ω˜ (ρ, ξ)
)
(43)
s.t. : (32b), (32c), (39c), (39d), (39e), (39f),
We employ available softwares, such as CVX solver to solve
convex optimization problem (43). Moreover, as we use DC
method, we should employ iterative algorithm as Algorithm
1. This algorithm is ended when the stopping conditions
i.e., |ρ (µ+ 1)− ρ (µ)| ≤ θ and |ξ (µ+ 1)− ξ (µ)| ≤ θ are
satisfied, where θ is stopping threshold.
IV. MULTI UNTRUSTED RELAY SCENARIO WITH RELAY
SELECTION
In this section, we develop our system model to multi
untrusted relay when the relays adopt selection combining
(SC) technique. In the first phase, the source transmits the
message signal to a selected relay using the MRT beamformer.
It is clear in this phase, all the relays intercept the transmis-
sions and then attempt to extract the confidential information.
Moreover, in this phase, the destination transmits jamming
signal similar to prior scenario. In the second phase, the
selected relay broadcasts data and hence, all the non-selected
relays eavesdrop the emitted signal by the selected relay. In
this phase, we propose the source transmits jamming signal to
confuse both Willie and the other relays.
7A. Signal Model in Relay Selection Scenario
The received signal at relay  ( ∈ {1, 2, ...J}) where J is
the total numbers of relay, can be written as
y`(1) =
√
(1− ρ)Phdx`d + n`(1) , Ψ0,
√
ρPwHhsx
`(1)
s +
√
(1− ρ)Phdx`d + n`(1) , Ψ1,
(44)
where w = hsi‖hsi‖ , is the MRT beamformer at the source and
i (i ∈ {1, 2, ...J}) displays the index of the selected relay.
In the second phase, the selected relay amplifies the received
signal by an amplification factor of Gi. According to Section
II, the received signal at the destination is given by
y`d =

n`d, Ψ0,
Gi
√
ρPwHhsihidx
`(1)
s +Gin
`
ihid + n
`
d, Ψ1.
(45)
As mentioned, in the second phase all the non-selected un-
trusted relays except of selected relay hear the broadcasted
signal by selected relay. Therefore, the received signal at the
untrusted relay  ( 6= i) is
y`(2) = (46)
√
ξPhsx
`(2)
s + n
`(2)
 , Ψ0,(√
ρPwHhsix
`(1)
s +
√
(1− ρ)Phidx`d + n`i
)
Gihi +
√
ξPhsx
`(2)
s + n
`(2)
 ,
Ψ1,
By employing (44), the SINR at the selected relay i.e., relay i
is γi = γR (see equation (7)) and the other relays in the first
phase are obtained as
γ(1) =

0, Ψ0,
ργbfs
(1−ρ)γd+1
(a)
=
ρςbf
1−ρ , Ψ1,
(47)
where γd =
P‖hd‖2
σ2 , γ
bf
s =
P
∥∥∥∥ hHsi‖hsi‖hs
∥∥∥∥2
σ2 , ς
bf
 =
γbfs
γd
, and a
follows high SINR assumption. Moreover, by utilization (46),
the received SINR at the untrusted relay  6= i during the
second phase is given by
γ`(2) =

0, Ψ0,
ργsiγi(1−ξ)
(1−ξ)γi(1+(1−ρ)γid)+(ξγs+1)(ργsi+(1−ρ)γid+1) , Ψ1.
(48)
Furthermore, the received SINR at the destination can be
written as follows
γDi =

0, Ψ0,
ργsiγid(1−ξ)
ργsi+(2−ρ−ξ)γid+1
(a)
= ρςiγid(1−ξ)
ρςi+2−ρ−ξ , Ψ1,
(49)
Supposing the ith relay is selected, therefore, the instantaneous
secrecy rate can be obtained as follows,:
Risec =
1
2
[log (1 + γDi)− log (1 + ΓE)]+, (50)
where ΓE is maximum of information leaked to the untrusted
relays in two phases. As the untrusted relay is non-colluding,
ΓE can be expressed as
ΓE = max
i,∈{1,2,...J}|i6=
{
γ`(1) , γi, γ
`(2)

}
. (51)
Proposition 1: The amount of the information leaked to the
selected relay in the first phase is more than the other relays
in the both phases.
Proof: It is clear γ`(1) = γi = γ
`(2)
 , when Ψ0 happens.
when Ψ1 happens after some manipulation we have
γ
`(2)
 =
ργsiγi(1−ξ)
(1−ξ)γi(1+(1−ρ)γid)+(ξγs+1)(ργsi+(1−ρ)γid+1) <
ργsiγi(1−ξ)
(1−ξ)γi(1+(1−ρ)γid) =
ργsi
(1+(1−ρ)γid) = γi,
(52)
because (ξγs + 1) (ργsi + (1− ρ) γid + 1) is positive. Fur-
thermore, as there is large-scale multiple antennas at the
source, by benefiting Cauchy-Schwarz inequality the upper
bound of γ`(1) can be written as
γ`(1) =
ργbfi
(1− ρ) γd + 1 <
ργsi
(1 + (1− ρ) γid) = γi. (53)
Based on (53), (52), and (51) the information leakage is
equivalent to ΓE = max
i,∈{1,2,...J}|i 6=
{
γ
`(1)
 , γi, γ
`(2)

}
= γi.
Hence, the instantaneous secrecy rate can be simplify as
follows
Risec =
1
2
[log (1 + γDi)− log (1 + γi)]+. (54)
According to Subsection III-A, the operator [.]+ is ignorable.
B. Relay Selection Criterion
In this subsection, we study two cases for the relay selec-
tion: 1) Optimal relay selection, 2) suboptimal relay selection
with the assumption large-scale multiple antennas (LSMA) at
the source.
1) Optimal Relay Selection: With the aim of maximizing
the secrecy rate, we select a relay which leads to increase
secrecy rate. The optimization problem can be formulated as
follows
max
ρ,ξ,t0,T
max
i∈{1,2,...J}
prt
2
[
log
(
ρςiγid (1− ξ)
ρςi + 2− ρ− ξ
)
(55a)
− log
(
1 +
ρςi
1− ρ
)]
,
s.t. : (32b), (32c), (39c), (39d) (55b)
ln
(
ξµsw
(1− ξ)µiw
)
× ξµsw − ti ln (ε) ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...J}
(55c)
(1− ξ)µiw − ξµsw ≤ ti, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...J} (55d)
8where ςi = γsiγid and T = {t1, t2, ...tJ}. In order to solve
the optimization problem (55) we define a slack variable t˜ as
follows
max
∈{1,2,...J}
[
log
(
ρςiγid (1− ξ)
ρςi + 2− ρ− ξ
)
− log
(
1 +
ρςi
1− ρ
)]
= t˜,
(56)
By employing the epigraph method the optimization prob-
lem (55) can be rewritten as follows
max
ρ,ξ,t0,T,t˜
prt
2
t˜,
s.t. : (32b), (32c), (39c), (39d), (55c), (55d), (57a)
log
(
ρςiγid (1− ξ)
ρςi + 2− ρ− ξ
)
− log
(
1 +
ρςi
1− ρ
)
(57b)
≤ t˜,∀ ∈ {1, 2, ...J} .
In order to solve (57), we use the DC method similar to
III-C, but CVX solver illustrates this optimization problem
is infeasible.
2) Suboptimal Relay Selection: We propose a suboptimal
relay selection with the assumption of an LSMA at the source.
The instantaneous secrecy rate is
Risec =
1
2
log
(
1 + γDi
1 + γi
)
(58)
By substituting (49) and (47) into (58), we have
log
(
1+γDi
1+γi
)
= log
(
(γidρςi(1−ξ)−ξ+2−ρ+ρςi)(1−ρ)
(−ξ+2−ρ+ρςi)(ρςi−ρ+1)
)
, which
is a function of random variables γsi and γid. Owing to an
LSMA at the source and adopting the law of large numbers,
we can approximate γsi as γsi ' Ns × Pµsiσ2 . With this
approximation the secrecy rate is only a function of γid and
it is easy to show the secrecy rate is an increasing function
with respect to γid. Hence, the suboptimal relay selection can
be rewritten as follows
i∗ = max
i∈{1,2,...J}
1 + γDi
1 + γi
' max
i∈{1,2,...J}
|hid|2. (59)
As can be seen, the proposed suboptimal relay selection in
(59) enjoys from the low complexity.
V. MULTIPLE WILLIES SCENARIO
In this section, we extend our system model to a practical
scenario at which there are W Willies, W = {w1, w2, ..., wW }
in our considered network. For such a network, we investigate
two cases 1) Non Colluding Willies, 2) Colluding Willies. In
the following, we explain each of these cases separately.
A. Non-Colluding Willies
In this subsection, we assume the Willies are non-colluding,
i.e., each of them separately tries to detect that the data is
transmitted or not. Hence, for power allocation, we should
first select the Willie with the lowest error detection (i.e., the
worst Willie should be selected) and then we follow the same
power allocation strategy mentioned in Section IV. It is clear
that the expressions (35) and (36) are decreasing functions
with respect to ddwdsw and
dsw
drw
, respectively. Therefore, the worst
Willie in first and second phases are w∗(1) = max
wi∈W
ddwi
dswi
and
w∗(2) = max
wi∈W
dswi
drwi
, respectively.
B. Colluding Willies
In this subsection, we assume the Willies are colluding,
i.e., each of them delivers its received signal energy to a
Fusion Center (FC) to decide on the presence or absence
of the data transmission. Therefore, the received signal en-
ergy at the FC in the first and second phases are Y (1)FC =
W∑
wi=1
n∑`
=1
∣∣∣y`(1)wi ∣∣∣2 and Y (2)FC = W∑
wi=1
n∑`
=1
∣∣∣y`(2)wi ∣∣∣2, respectively.
Similar to Section III and this fact that the summation of
n independent exponential random variables Xi with differ-
ent parameters λi have the probability density function of
fX1+X2+...+Xn(x)=
 nΠi=1λi n∑j=1 e−λjxnΠ
k=1
k 6=j
(λk−λj)
 x > 0, the
probability of false alarm and miss detection are respectively,
given by
P(1)FA =

W
Π
i=1
τˆ
(1)
i
W∑
j=1
e
−τˆ(1)
j (ϑ(1)−Wσ2w)
W
Π
k=1
k 6=j
(
τˆ
(1)
k −τˆ
(1)
j
) , ϑ(1) −Wσ2w > 0,
1, ϑ(1) −Wσ2w ≤ 0,
(60)
P(1)MD =

1− 2WΠ
i=1
τ˜
(1)
i
2W∑
j=1
e
−τ˜(1)
j (ϑ(1)−Wσ2w)
2W
Π
k=1
k 6=j
(
τ˜
(1)
k −τ˜
(1)
j
) ϑ(2) −Wσ2w > 0,
0 ϑ(2) −Wσ2w ≤ 0,
(61)
where τˆ (1)i = ((1− ρ)Pµdwi)−1 , i = 1, ...,W , τ˜ (1)i =
τˆ
(1)
i , i = 1, ...,W , and τ˜
(1)
i = (ρPµswi)
−1
, i = W +
1, ...2W . Likewise, one can obtain the probability of false
alarm and miss detection in the second phase. By substituting
the calculated probability of false alarm and miss detection
into (32), the mentioned optimization problem is intractable
and its solution is very complex, especially for large number
of Willies in the network. To tackle this issue, we use the
central limit theorem (CLT) to calculate the probability of
false alarm and miss detection in the both phases. In order
to simplify mathematics, we assume the Willi’s channels are
independent and identically distributed (iid), i.e., µswi = µswj ,
µrwi = µrwj , µdwi = µdwj , ∀wi &wj ∈W , [28], [27]. Using
of the CLT leads to the following equations
P(1)FA = Q
(
ϑ(1) − µ(1)fa
σ
(1)
fa
)
, P(1)MD = 1−Q
(
ϑ(1) − µ(1)md
σ
(1)
md
)
,
(62)
P(2)FA = Q
(
ϑ(2) − µ(2)fa
σ
(2)
fa
)
, P(2)MD = 1−Q
(
ϑ(2) − µ(2)md
σ
(2)
md
)
,
(63)
9ϑ
(1)
opt1 =
−µ(1)fa σ(1)2md + µ(1)mdσ(1)2fa
σ
(1)2
fa − σ(1)2md
+√
2 ln
(
σ
(1)
fa
σ
(1)
md
)
σ
(1)4
fa σ
(1)2
md − 2 ln
(
σ
(1)
fa
σ
(1)
md
)
σ
(1)2
fa σ
(1)4
md + µ
(1)2
fa σ
(1)2
fa σ
(1)2
md − 2µ(1)faµ(1)mdσ(1)2fa σ(1)2md + µ(1)2md σ(1)2fa σ(1)2md
σ
(1)2
fa − σ(1)2md
(64)
ϑ
(1)
opt2 =−
µ
(1)
fa σ
(1)2
md − µ(1)mdσ(1)2fa
σ
(1)2
fa − σ(1)2md
−√
2 ln
(
σ
(1)2
fa
σ
(1)
md
)
σ
(1)4
fa σ
(1)2
md − 2 ln
(
σ
(1)
fa
σ
(1)
md
)
σ
(1)2
fa σ
(1)4
md + µ
(1)2
fa σ
(1)2
fa σ
(1)2
md − 2µ(1)faµ(1)mdσ(1)2fa σ(1)2md + µ(1)2md σ(1)2fa σ(1)2md
σ
(1)2
fa − σ(1)2md
(65)
where µ(1)fa = W (1− ρ)Pµdw + Wσ2w, σ(1)fa =√
W (1− ρ)Pµdw, µ(1)md = WρPµsw + W (1− ρ)Pµdw +
Wσ2w, σ
(1)
md =
√
Wρ2P 2µ2sw +W (1− ρ)2P 2µ2dw,
µ
(2)
fa = WξPµsw + Wσ
2
w, σ
(2)
fa =
√
WξPµsw,
µ
(2)
md = W (1− ξ)Pµrw + WξPµsw + Wσ2w,
σ
(2)
md =
√
W (1− ξ)2P 2µ2rw +Wξ2P 2µ2sw, and Q(x) is
Q-function. In the following, we first find the optimal
threshold for Willie and then formulate our optimization
problem.
1) Optimal Threshold for Willie: In order to obtain optimal
ϑ(1), we derivative from P(1)FA + P
(1)
MD with respect to ϑ
(1).
After calculation
d
(
P(1)FA+P
(1)
MD
)
dϑ(1)
= 0 and some mathematical
manipulations, we obtain (64) and (65) at the top of the this
page. Note that since µ(1)md ≥ µ(1)fa and σ(1)md ≥ σ(1)fa , it is clear
to show that ϑ(1)opt1 ≤ 0 and ϑ(1)opt2 ≥ 0 and hence, ϑ(1)opt2 is
acceptable. Likewise, ϑ(2)opt1 and ϑ
(2)
opt2 are obtainable.
2) Optimization problem: Similar to Section III, the opti-
mization problem can be written as follows
max
ρ,ξ
prt
2
(
Σ (ρ, ξ)− Ω˜ (ρ, ξ)
)
(66a)
s.t. : (32b), (32c), (66b)
1−Q
(
ϑ
(1)
opt2 − µ(1)md
σ
(1)
md
)
+Q
(
ϑ
(1)
opt2 − µ(1)fa
σ
(1)
fa
)
≥ 1− ε,
(66c)
1−Q
(
ϑ
(2)
opt2 − µ(2)md
σ
(2)
md
)
+Q
(
ϑ
(2)
opt2 − µ(2)fa
σ
(2)
fa
)
≥ 1− ε.
(66d)
The left side of (66c) is a decreasing function of ρ. Therefore,
the constraint (66c) is equivalent to ρ ≤ ρub. Furthermore,
the left side of (66d) is an increasing function of ξ, therefore,
the constraint (66c) is equivalent to ξ ≥ ξlb. Conclusively,
the optimization problem (66a) is equivalent to the following
convex optimization problem
max
ρ,ξ
prt
2
(
Σ (ρ, ξ)− Ω˜ (ρ, ξ)
)
(67a)
s.t. : 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρub, (67b)
ξlb ≤ ξ ≤ 1. (67c)
To solve the convex optimization problem (67), we use the
available softwares such as CVX solver.
VI. SECURE NULL SPACE BEAMFORMING OF DIRECT
TRANSMISSION SCHEME
In the direct transmission scheme, we assume there is
the direct link between the source and the destination and
hence, the transmission only is performed in one phase. When
the source transmits its signal with Ns antenna, the relays
are treated as pure eavesdroppers, i.e., they only listen to
the signal. Furthermore, Willies try to detect whether the
source has sent a signal to the destination or not, in the
transmission phase. In order to deceive the untrusted relays
and Willies, the source transmits information and jamming
signal simultaneously, and it employs null space beamforming
of jamming signal over the destination’s channel, to increase
the secrecy rate. The detailed formulations of this secure
transmission scheme is provided in Appendix A.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are presented to evaluate
the performance of joint covert communication and PLS in
one-way relay network in presence of one source and one
destination, one untrusted relay and one Willie. The used
parameters in our simulations are: σ2w = σ
2 = −50 dBW,
the path loss exponent α = 4, probability of transmission in
each time slot prt = 0.5, the channels are assumed complex
Gaussian random variables and the maximum transmission
power in each time slot P = 10 dBW. Without loss of
generality, we assume the source, the destination, the untrusted
relay, and Willie are located at (−5, 0), (5, 0), (0, 0), and
(0,−5).
Fig. 3 shows the ergodic secrecy rate versus transmission
power for single relay and single Willie case. As can be
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Fig. 3: Ergodic secrecy rate versus maximum transmit power for
single relay and Willie, Ns = 16.
seen, the ergodic secrecy rate is an increasing function with
respect to the transmit power. The reason is that in the
studied scenarios (the direct transmission and the two hops
scenarios), the injected jamming signal only degrades the
received information signal at the illegitimate nodes and has
not impact on the received information signal at the destination
because of employing null space beamforming technique in the
direct transmission scenario and interference cancellation in
the two hops scenario. Moreover, the the ergodic secrecy rate
of the direct transmission scheme surpass two hops scheme in
low transmit power and opposite behavior is observed in high
transmit power. This is because by equipping with multiple
antenna and employing an MRT beamformer at the source,
the information leakage in illegitimate nodes is negligible and
the received SNR at the destination is considerable.
In Fig. 4, the ergodic secrecy rate versus number of antenna
at source is shown. This figure evaluates effect of lower bound
of detection error probability at Willie i.e., 1− . As seen in
this figure, guaranty of 99.9% error in detection of Willie with
respect to guaranty of 99% error, decreases the ergodic secrecy
rate %14.35. The reason is that by increasing lower bound of
detection error probability, in the first phase, the source has
to decrease the power of information signal and destination
has to increase the power of jamming signal, furthermore,
in the second phase the relay has to decrease the power of
information signal and the source has to increase the power
of jamming signal, which leads to decrease ergodic secrecy
rate.
In Fig. 5, we study the impact of the relay’s position and
Willie’s position on the ergodic secrecy rate. In this figure, we
assume the untrusted relay moves from source to destination as
depicted in Fig. 6. The figure illustrates that for given number
of source antennas, there is a optimal relay location which
maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate. For example, when Ns =
16, the optimal distance between source and relay is dsr = 8
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Fig. 4: Ergodic secrecy rate versus numbers of antenna at source,
P = 10 dBW.
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Fig. 5: Ergodic secrecy rate versus distance between source and
untrusted relay, the number of source antennas Ns = 16.
while when Ns = 64, the optimal distance is dsr = 9. Fig. 5
also illustrates that when the untrusted relay is near to source
it is recommended number of antenna at source to become
lower than when it is far source.
In Fig. 7, the impact of the number of untrusted relays on
the ergodic secrecy rate in our system model is depicted. In
this plot, the number of antennas at source is Ns = 16 and
we assume the untrusted relays and Willies are distributed
uniformly around of (0, 0) and (0,−5), respectively. We
evaluate this scenario for two cases of small, medium, and
large number of Willies, 1, 5, 10, respectively. This figure
shows that the ergodic secrecy rate is an increasing function of
the number of untrusted relays J . This means that employing
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Fig. 6: Location schematic of nodes.
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Fig. 7: Ergodic secrecy rate versus number of relay, under non-
colluding Willies scenario, Ns = 16,  = 0.1.
more untrusted relays increases the ergodic secrecy rate of the
network. By increasing the number of non-colluding Willies,
the ergodic secrecy rate is decreased, because the source
should decrease the information transmit power and increase
the jamming transmit power to satisfy covert requirement
which leads to a decrease in the ergodic secrecy rate. By
increasing the number of Willies from 1 to 5, the ergodic
secrecy rate decreases about %64.15 while by increasing the
number of Willies from 5 to 10, it decreases about %53.53.
Furthermore, we have simulated the direct transmission. As
can be seen, increasing the number of relays in the two hops
scenario increases the ergodic secrecy rate, while the opposite
behavior is observed for the direct transmission scenario. This
is because by increasing J the probability of emerging a
stronger relay- destination’s channel in the two hops scenario
increases which leads to enhancing the ergodic secrecy rate.
While in the direct transmission scenario, by increasing J the
probability of emerging a stronger wiretap channel increases
which leads to a decrease in the ergodic secrecy rate
In Fig. 8, the impact of the number of untrusted relays on
the ergodic secrecy rate for the non-colluding and colluding
cases are investigated. This figure states that by increasing
the number of untrusted relays, the achievable secrecy rate
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Fig. 8: Ergodic secrecy rate versus number of relays under two cases
of non-colluding Willies and colluding Willies, Ns = 16,  = 0.1.
improves for both the non-colluding and colluding Willies.
Therefore, this figure shows the priority of the proposed se-
cure transmission scheme compared to the direct transmission
scheme ignoring the untrusted relays. Furthermore, as can be
seen in this figure, by increasing the number of Willies from
1 to 5 for the non-colluding case, the ergodic secrecy rate
decreases about %55, while for the colluding case it decreases
about %71. Moreover, the network in the presence of 10 non-
colluding Willies compared to 5 colluding Willies has lower
ergodic secrecy rate. As shown, by increasing the number of
relays, the secrecy performance of colluding Willies case is
lower than the non-colluding case. Because in the colluding
Willies case, Willies combine the received signal energies to
decide on the presence or absence of communication which
leads to low detection error probability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of secure transmission
with covert requirement in untrusted relaying networks. Our
considered system model consisted of one source, one desti-
nation, one untrusted relay, and one Willie. We assumed that
the source is equipped with multiple antennas, while the rest
are equipped with a single antenna. In our considered system
model, the untrusted relay tried to extract the information
signal, while the goal of Willie was to detect the presence
of the information signal transmitted by the source, in the
communication phase. To overcome these two attacks, we
illustrated that the destination and the source should inject
jamming signals to the network in phase I and phase II,
respectively. For this system model, we proposed a new power
allocation strategy to maximize the instantaneous secrecy rate
subject to satisfying the covert requirements in both of the
phases. Since the proposed optimization problem was non-
convex, we adopted the Successive Convex Approximation
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(SCA) approach to convert it to a convex optimization prob-
lem. We next generalized our system model to a more practical
communication network where there are multiple untrusted
relays and multiple Willies under two cases of non-colluding
Willies and colluding Willies. For the non-colluding case, we
proposed a novel optimization problem at which the Willie
with the lowest detection error is selected in each phase.
Furthermore, for the colluding Willies case, Willies combine
the received signal energies to decide on the presence or
absence of communication. Numerical results revealed that
when the untrusted relay is near to the source fewer number of
source’s antennas is needed compared to the case that the relay
is far from the source. Finally, as a benchmark, we investigated
the conventional direct transmission dispensing with the relays
to compare with the proposed transmission scheme.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: SECURE NULL SPACE BEAMFORMING OF
DIRECT TRANSMISSION SCHEME
The received `th signal at receiver m (relay, destination and
Willie) in the direct transmission scheme is given by
y`m =

zHhsmx
`
sj + n
`
m, Ψ0,
√
ρPwHhsmx
`
si + z
Hhsmx
`
sj + n
`
m, Ψ1,
(68)
where weight vector w represents the MRT beamformer for
data signal at the source and defined as w = hsd‖hsd‖ . Moreover,
z ∈ CNs×1 is define as the jamming weight vector at the
source and ‖z‖ = √(1− ρ)P . Note that x`sj and x`si are
jamming and information signals, respectively, and the factor ρ
is the power allocation between the information bearing signal
and the artificial noise emitted by the source. The received
SINR at the destination and the th relay are respectively, given
by
γD =

0, Ψ0,
ρP‖wHhsd‖2
‖zHhsd‖2+σ2 , Ψ1,
γ =

0, Ψ0,
ρP‖wHhs‖2
‖zHhs‖2+σ2 , Ψ1.
(69)
We assume the relays are non-clouding, hence, the secrecy
rate is given by
Rsec =
[
log (1 + γD)− log
(
max
∈{1,2,...J}
(1 + γ)
)]+
. (70)
We formulate the optimization problem which its aim is to
maximize the worst-case secrecy rate as:
max
ρ,z,t0
prt
[
log (1 + γD)− log
(
max
∈{1,2,...J}
(1 + γ)
)]
(71a)
s.t. : 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, (71b)
ln
(
‖z‖2
ρP
)
× ‖z‖2 − t0 ln (ε) ≤ 0, (71c)
ρP − ‖z‖2 ≤ t0, (71d)
zHhsd = 0, (71e)
‖z‖2 = (1− ρ)P. (71f)
We define the slack variable ν as 1ν = max∈{1,2,...J}
(1 + γ),
hence, the optimization problem (71) can be rewritten as
follow
max
ρ,z,t0
prt
[
log
(
1 +
ρP
∥∥wHhsd∥∥2
σ2
)
+ log (ν)
]
(72a)
s.t. : (71b), (71e),
ln
(
(1− ρ)P
ρP
)
× (1− ρ)P − t0 ln (ε) ≤ 0, (72b)
ρP − (1− ρ)P ≤ t0, (72c)
ρP
∥∥wHhsj∥∥2 + ∥∥zHhs∥∥2 + σ2 ≤ (72d)∥∥zHhs∥∥2 + σ2
ν
, ∀ ∈ {1, 2, ...J} .
The Constraint (72d) is non-convex because of term
‖zHhs‖2+σ2
ν . In order to convert the optimization problem
to convex one, we replace this quadratic-over-linear function
with their corresponding first order expansions. The first-order
Taylor expansion of the right side of Constraint (72d) at a point
of (z˜, ν˜) is 2ν˜ − νν˜2 +
2Re{z˜HHsjz}
ν˜ − z˜
HHsjz
ν˜ ν, [29]. Finally,
we solve the following convex optimization problem
max
ρ,z,t0
prt
[
log
(
1 +
ρP
∥∥wHhsd∥∥2
σ2
)
+ log (ν)
]
(73a)
s.t. : (71b), (71e), (72b), (72c),
ρP
∥∥wHhsj∥∥2 + ∥∥zHhs∥∥2 + σ2 ≤ (73b)
2
ν˜
− ν
ν˜2
+
2Re
{
z˜HHsjz
}
ν˜
− z˜
HHsjz
ν˜
ν, ∀ ∈ {1, 2, ...J} .
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